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In arenas of conflict in the latter half of the twentieth century,
there is no peace in the Middle East with one possible and tentative
exception. If peace is characterized not merely as a temporary
cessation of hostilities between two warring parties, but as the
establishment of positive relationships such that conflicts are
resolved through diplomacy, negotiations, mediation, arbitration or the
rule of law - that is, through peaceful means - then the only possible
positive sign of peace in the Middle East is in the Israeli/Palestinian
and Israeli/Arab conflict.
There is no peace in Afghanistan even though the Soviets withdrew
years ago; though the communists were ousted, the rebels continue to
fight among themselves to determine who should form the successor
government. There is no peace in Iran; rebels peiodically engage in
sabotage against the regime of the Mullahs. There is no peace in Iraq;
the Kurds practice a wary autonomy under the military protection of the
West while the Shiites in the south suffer under the oppressive Hussein
regime; and Saddam Hussein periodically flexes his muscles and sends
shivers through the Middle East and the rest of the world. A civil war
rages in Yemen. 
At the other end of the Middle East, in the Maghreb, the Algerians
are fighting a repressive campaign against the sabotage of the Islamic
fundamentalists whose victory in an election was overthrown by the
military; 3000 have been killed in this past year alone, 10,000 over
the past three years. In Egypt, the revolt is more sporadic, and the
death toll is not as spectacular. But as in Algeria, it is the death of
foreigners, particularly Europeans, that brings the simmering conflict
back onto the world stage. The Middle East is a hotbed of tension and
sometimes outright war from one end to the other. 
In the midst of all these conflicts between fellow religionists
and frequently members of the same ethnic group, and in spite of the
recent spate of terrorist actions and human bombs aimed at Israeli
civilians and military alike by Hamas, there is shockingly one shining
2star of peace, not the brightest of stars by a long shot, but a star
nevertheless - the Israel-Jordan peace agreement and the tentative,
fragile and increasingly more solid Israeli/Palestinian peace as the
centrepiece in resolving the Israeli/Arab conflict. 
It is that area of nascent peace and the peace process that I want
to examine in this lecture. And I want to do so from a very angular and
very marginal perspective - the role of Canada in that process.1 Canada
is not a country that has provided either a direction or procedural
mechanisms for helping resolve the Middle East conflict as, for
example, the United States has done. Nor in the two cases I examine did
Canada perform as a mediator. When the idea of partitioning Palestine
between the Jews and the Arabs first became a subject for negotiations
in international fora, specifically in the UN, Canada's role in the
beginning of this full scale conflict in 1947 was as a participant in
a committee of eleven countries assigned the task of recommending a
solution. Canada's role as "gavel" of the multilateral refugee talks in
the very recent round of international peace negotiations was that of
someone asked to bring some procedural order to one major aspect of the
problem in a process already underway.
Canada would seem to be a country ill-equipped to understand and
play any role in the Middle East conflict. It is far away. It is a huge
country compared to the miniscule area occupied by both the Israelis
and the Palestinians. Canada is a country suffused with repressed
optimism with respect to conflict in contrast to the apparent pessimism
of the Middle East and its plethora of variations on the fable of the
scorpion and the fox. More significantly, "There is no ideology of
Canadiansim."2 Canada is a country built on process rather than
substantial beliefs; it is a country based on law and order. The
tradition of Toryism and the acceptance of a need for conscious control
rather than an emphasis on liberty has been integral to Canadian
history. Canada in the last quarter century has also become a country
with an enviable reputation for tolerance and respect for diversity. 
But Canada also wears a cloud over its head from its internal
divisions and regional sensitivities, and is menaced by secession.
The way Canada deals with its own divisions can be used to understand
how it deals with the divisions in other areas. More to the point for
this lecture, the way Canada deals with divisions elsewhere is a good
way to understand how Canada deals with its own divisions. The two
roles are complementary. Whether the comparative analysis I offer
teaches us more about Canada than about the peace process itself, I
leave for you to decide.
3In Joe Clark's recent book, A Nation Too Good to Lose, the premise
running through the monograph is that problems can be solved through
dialogue, or, in simpler terminology, through talk. In spite of the
fact that the majority in one province, Quebec, believes in an
assymetrical arrangement with the rest of Canada, and the majority in
the rest of Canada vociferously reject any form of assymetrical
relationship among the provinces, that is, in spite of the fact that
there seems to be no solution to the constitutional crisis that
afflicts Canada, Canadians endlessly debate the way their country
should be restructured. These debates have preoccupied Canadians during
my entire adult life. And Joe Clark is the quintessential Canadian.
Even when there is overwhelming evidence that negotiations on the
federal system have not really progressed except for the one unique
moment when Trudeau repatriated the constitution, but did so without
the support of Quebec, Clark insists that what we need is more
dialogue. Joe Clark has been the politician par excellance who has
believed that when everyone despaired of resolving a conflict, he was
prepared to keep talking.
This is because Joe Clark does not believe that solutions are what
counts. It is the process itself. For Joe Clark, there are no
fundamental convictions about the formal or territorial arrangements
between and among contending groups. Everything can be resolved by good
intentions and dialogue. "Keep them talking," is the motto of a very
dominant strain of Canadian negotiators on the domestic and, as I shall
try to show, on the foreign scene as well.
The purpose of this paper is to spell out the ideological premises
of this approach to problem solving through a comparative examination
of two cases where Canada and Canadians formally played a leading role
in attempting to find a solution in the Middle East conflict. The
intention is not so much to indicate the naiveté of such an approach to
conflicts, but rather the part it plays, not in resolving conflicts,
but in enabling others with convictions to have a cover for shifting
their positions. Rational and well intentioned discourse is not the
route to resolve conflicts, but a modern city expressway where traffic
piles up and people vent their spleens enables those who wish to make
progress pursue it on back roads and more hidden routes.
Let me put the Canadian posture pithily. Canadians do not adopt
a veil of ignorance à la Rawls3 in order to free ourselves from any
special interest; Canada is the veil of ignorance itself. Canada allows
others to engage in their belly dancing behind the veil. Canadians in
adopting neutrality towards conflictual issues presents itself as
lacking a bottom line. This is projected not as a fault but as a virtue
4characterized by non-committal with respect to any sense of the good or
the status of any group or nation. Canadians are committed to the
notion that what is fundamental to any problem of conflict is to permit
people their say to convince the other of the legitimacy of their
claims. What is ultimately decisive is rational persuasion, not the
"facts" on the ground, but the ideas in one's head.4 This is a radical
contrast with both Israelis and Palestinians; in both groups, most
members are willing to sacrifice their lives for their convictions and
loyalties. Canadians are the epitome of Bruce Ackerman's methodological
rationalists using a dialectic of rational and empirical constructs to
resolve conflicts.5 Canada presents itself as the rationally neutral
state without any priviledged moral or political convictions.
Rational conversation has the advantage of allowing people to
respond to misstatements and correct errors and misunderstandings. That
conversation is not a method for resolving fundamental divisions over
convictions and values. In a conversation, ideally the participants
respond to the needs of the other and attempt to hear his or her
perspective. But the conversation does not help when the central issue
is precisely whether the needs of the other should count. Conversation
has a give and take plasticity which is ill-suited to mediating
convictions held with no plasticity. Conversation makes it possible to
come to a mutual understanding, and talk is not taken to be an
obstacle, when there is some shared understanding. Otherwise talk is a
cover, sometimes a necessary and very useful one when the only other
alternative is war.
This is not a study of the role of law or of coercive forces used
as peacekeepers which many identify with Canada.6 Of the four R's of
international relations - rights, rules, realism and rationalism,
Canada exemplifies the rationalist tradition. Reason, not fundamental
individual or communitarian rights, not established standards and
traditions, and certainly not inclinations and interests and the
consequences of actions on them, is the foundation for any approach to
conflict. But it is not a reason which discovers moral principles as a
more fundamental foundation for resolving disputes, or reason
identified with established norms, and least of all reason which rises
above particular interests and inclinations. Canada is not part of the
Kantian faith in the lofty role of reason.7 It is reason as rhetoric.
But it is not the rhetoric which Aristotle equated with public speaking
and the use of argument to persuade others by emotional appeals, but
the rhetoric of talk, the logic of discussion or dialectic. 
My thesis is simple. Canada is the country of Talk, Talk, Talk.
5The religion of the Quiet Canadian is a belief in Talk. In conflict
situations, the ostensible reason for the talk is to allow the
conflicting parties to bridge their positions. But the actual role that
talk plays is as camouflage. Behind the veil of talk, not through it,
the parties acquire a camouflage behind which they can shift positions.8
This is not a Platonic dialectic which allows us to penetrate to the
essence of what is; it is not a dialectic concerned with reality, truth
and goodness. Quite the opposite; it is a dialectic which obfuscates
and, through such obfuscation, allows transformations to take place
without revealing that they are manifestations of interests,
inclinations and a priori dogmatic convictions. It is a dialectic which
allows one to look at an issue from opposite sides, which takes opinion
as the foundation of a prologomena to truth rather than its antithesis.
But unlike Aristotelian dialectic which also reasons from opinions, it
is not the talk that overcomes the obstructions, but, rather, the talk
which disguises the fact that the obstructions are being overcome
because individuals are changing their opinions. It is the dialectic of
the cunning of reason, the noble lie aimed at accommodation rather than
truth.
I will try to illustrate this thesis by comparing two case studies
in which Canada played a quasi-mediating role in the Israeli-Arab
conflict. Those cases are taken from 1947 and 1993 respectively. After
the examination of both those cases, I will try to indicate what the
analysis suggests about Canada and the nature of the peace process.
II CANADA'S ROLE IN UNSCOP
a) Background
We all recall the position of the conflict in 1947. Britain had
not been able to resolve its responsibilities over Palestine either to
its own satisfaction or that of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine.
Britain could not solve the problem on its own and it could not solve
it in partnership with either the Arab states before the war or with
the United States after the war.
The only feasible solution, other than a victory of one party over
the other, was partition. Partition had died in 1937, was reborn during
the war and died again in 1944, was revived by the Colonial Office in
January of 1946 and vetoed by the Foreign Office. Following a review
after the war, partition was revived again as a joint proposal of the
Foreign Office and Colonial Office. Bevin came up with his own
idiosyncratic idea of partitioning Palestine and giving the Arab parts
to Transjordan and Lebanon, but the Cabinet preferred a Provincial
6Autonomy model to which Ambassador Grady of the U.S. consented. Truman,
however, vetoed the Provincial Autonomy Plan proposal by Grady and
Morrison.9  
Reference of the problem to the U.N. seemed the only available
option of those presented to Bevin when he took office in 1945.10 It is
not from the earlier skirmishes over refugees, over the
responsibilities and duties over Mandates, over the attempts to
transfer Britain's responsibilities over the Mandate to the Trusteeship
Council, but from the period that Britain referred the matter to the UN
and the UN set up the United Nations Special Committeee on Palestine
(UNSCOP), on which Canada became a member, that I want to consider
Canada's role in the Middle East peace process.
In February of 1947, Britain referred the conflict in its Mandate
in Palestine to the UN for advice. Britain asked asked the U.N. to
recommend the terms of a settlement without binding itself to follow
the recommendation or transferring the authority over the territory to
the U.N. to implement those recommendations. Britain confessed its
authority was inadequate, but insisted on retaining that authority. The
United Kingdom only asked the United Nations to recommend a settlement.
But without a transfer of authority to the U.N., the terms of the
Mandate could not be altered under a Trusteeship.
The timing could not have been worse. The United Nations was
handed a problem that had reached a dead end while the United Nations
itself was still a novitiate. Further, the Great Powers were not in a
cooperative spirit. The world was about to give birth to the Cold War.
The cooperation of the Great Powers was required if the United Nations
was to fulfill the lofty mission assigned to it. In general terms, this
cooperation was totally lacking. The world was entering a period in
which the last few bridges spanning the chasm between the West and the
U.S.S.R. were about to fall.  The putsch in Czechoslovakia and the
dissolution of the four-power administration in Germany11 the following
year would eliminate any lingering hopes of Great Power cooperation.
Further, Great Britain and the United States were at odds over
Palestine, as the fallout from the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry
Report indicated.
The United Nations had no legal authority over Palestine. The
United Nations authority to partition a mandated territory, even if the
Mandate had been legally transferred to the United Nations, was in
question, since that decision went against the will of the majority of
the population of the territory. The United Nations lacked the force or
an unambiguous authorization to use force within a territory. The
7United Nations lacked any clear authority to implement a solution if
one of the parties to the dispute disagreed. Further, the United
Nations was ill-equipped in any case to assume the responsibilities for
even administering the territory. It lacked the political coherence and
the administrative expertise to assume governmental functions. 
But the United Nations could give advice which would have moral
force, a moral force which could accrue to itself legal authority. And
the matter had become urgent. The terrorist campaign against the
British was quickly becoming a war of national liberation even while
the Jewish Agency continued to give lip service to condeming terrorist
actions. British civilians and dependents were evacuated at the end of
January. In response to terrorist threats to ` give an eye for an eye',
British personnel were confined behind armed barriers. Barclay's Bank
in Haifa was bombed, killing two and injuring another four. The next
day, on March 1st, the British officers' club in Jerusalem was bombed
destroying one wing and killing a dozen officers. The Shell Oil storage
tanks in Haifa were sabotaged destroying ten of them. Four British
soldiers were kidnapped and flogged in response to a flogging sentence
on an Irgun member. Civilians were kidnapped.  The Cairo-Haifa train
was mined with five soldiers dead and twenty-three others wounded.
On April 28, 1947 when the First Special Session of the General
Assembly opened at Lake Success, the Arab states immediately proposed
inclusion of an additional item to the agenda -- "the termination of
the Mandate and the declaration of its independence".12  The proposal
was defeated. The Arab attempt, in effect, to derail U.N. consideration
had itself been derailed. But any attempt to broaden or strengthen the
U.N. involvement would produce further delays. The debates over
representation by non-states, the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher
Committee, had itself required lengthy debates dealing not only with
the parties themselves but with precedents for other non government
organizations.
Finally, and most importantly, there was the attitude of Britain
itself which was perhaps the most crucial and which became clear over
the next twelve months. Britain not only refused to enter into a
transfer agreement, Britain not only did not propose or consider any
conditions for the U.N. taking on the responsibility for making a
recommendation, the U.K. refused to commit itself to cooperate with the
United Nations. "Britain insisted on ` undivided' authority until the
Mandate ended,"13 and would not and did not grant any degree of
authority whatsoever to the U.N. over the Palestine Mandate.
Aside from the bad timing when taking on the responsibility of
8making a recommendation on the problem while also lacking the power or
administrative know-how or legal authority to take over the Mandate and
the questionable legal authority to do so, let alone to do so by
implementing a solution unpopular with at least one or the other side,
aside from the lack of clear terms of reference and/or the agreement of
Britain to cooperate, and the explicit refusal to guarantee such
cooperation, it is questionable whether the United Nations was equipped
ever to facilitate a peaceful transfer of power using its moral
authority. 
b) Impartiality
What motivated and determined the U.N. position was not the
military considerations or the power politics of the issue, but a moral
commitment to do everything in its power to maintain peace and to
adjudicate disputes in as impartial a way as possible. The effect of
this overwhelming moral consideration and attempt at impartiality was
that the U.N. ignored its own weak political power and legal position,
which, if strengthened in advance, might have given the U.N. a firmer
control over whatever solution emerged. It also seemed to compel the
U.N. to underrate the role of the Great Powers. Would moral purity,
would an independent and objective process be sufficient itself to
unite the Great Powers, even if the solution alienated one or even both
parties directly involved in the conflict? Ironically, one force behind
the "moral" stance was the United States. Truman refused even to
contemplate the use or even threat to use force by the Great Powers to
enforce a solution.
The United States wanted a committee of eleven neutral countries.
The U.S. was supported by the U.K. in this, though the U.S.S.R., and
"neutral" countries like Canada, were initially opposed.14  The make-up
of the final committee conformed to the U.S. guidelines, if not all the
specifics. The eleven "neutral" countries included two Commonwealth
nations -- Canada and Australia (the U.S. had originally suggested New
Zealand); two Eastern European nations, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia
(the U.S. had originally proposed Poland); three Latin American
countries -- Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay (the U.S. had originally
proposed two -- Brazil and Mexico); two Western European nations --
Sweden and the Netherlands (the U.S. had originally suggested Belgium);
and two Asian nations -- India and Iran (the U.S. had proposed Turkey
and a third country from the South Pacific - the Philippine Republic).15
The contending -- and losing -- viewpoint supporting Great Power
involvement on the Special Committee was put forward by Argentina. The
decision that membership should go to "neutral" or "impartial" states
9on the basis of an equitable geographical distribution and excluding
the Big Powers was hotly debated.
On May 8, 1947, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, stated
that the U.S.S.R. was prepared, to take upon itself, together with
other permanent members of the Security Council and together with the
United Nations as a whole, the responsibility 
not only for the final decisions that may be taken by the UN on the
Palestine problem, but also for the preparation of the decisions.
Those supporting big power involvement were not restricted to the
Eastern bloc in an attempt to insert a Soviet presence into the Middle
East. Lester (Mike) Pearson of Canada held the same view:
He thought exclusion of the Great Powers from the 
committees of investigation would seriously weaken 
its authority and might result in the submission of 
an impractical report entirely unacceptable to those 
states which would have to put it into effect.16
The dominant desire was to make the committee neutral.  Neutrality
entailed an absence of prior commitments. Neutrality entailed an
impartial examination of the Palestine question as Dean Acheson argued.
Dean Acheson also argued that Canadians should be included on the
committee since Canada did not have, "a really serious Jewish
problem".17  It is not clear whether he meant Canada was not troubled
by a history of anti-semitism or whether Canada lacked an effective
Jewish lobby which so irritated both the State Department and the
President.
Neutrality meant Arabs and Jews were excluded from membership on
the committee.18  Neutrality meant lack of prior stated commitments. It
did not mean absence of bias. A country or a representative would be
considered partial: (a) if it had already expressed a prior commitment
to one outcome or another; (b) if its existing commitments
predetermined one outcome rather than another; (c) or if it had a
vested interest in the outcome. The Arab states were clearly partial.
So was the U.K. So were the United States and the U.S.S.R. as major
powers committed to securing their interests in this area. Impartial,
in a strong sense, could mean not partial to one party in the dispute.
In this contest, impartial had a weaker meaning -- not partial to one
outcome of the dispute based on prior commitments. It did not mean no
partiality at all towards a position. Impartial also meant no specific
political interest in the region and, in that sense, required
disinterested parties to be involved in the adjudication.
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Of the criteria of impartiality, an absence of prior commitment
to a position and an absence of prior involvement in the disputes were
absolute prerequisites to membership. The three other criteria of
impartiality -- impartiality to the parties, impartiality to positions
and a disinterested perspective, were to be handled by the overall
composition of the committee rather than in selecting any one
individual member for the committees.
A second criteria was "objectivity".  The countries chosen and
their appointees were expected to consider all factors without
distortion. In this respect, the personal qualities of the
representatives were intended to be more important than the countries
chosen to appoint those representatives.
The options facing the committee were clear enough. Partition
favoured the position of the dominant Zionist group. A unitary state
dominated by its Arab majority favoured the position of the Arabs. A
single state with a federal construction would be a position of
compromise initially unacceptable to either the Arabs or the Jews.
Ivan Rand was Canada's appointee on the Committee. Ralph Bunche,
the brilliant secretary of UNSCOP and future winner of the Nobel Prize
for peace for negotiating the armistice agreements between Isael and
the Arab states, had only contempt for Rand. He was the only member of
the committee for whom Bunche expressed disrespect. This would have
surprised Canadians had they known about it given the high esteem in
which the Canadian public held Ivan Rand. I hope that my account will
explain why a man as judicious and fair-minded, as skillful in
diplomacy and discretion as Ralph Bunche might have despised Ivan Rand.
The Canadian representative on UNSCOP acted as a neutral and
objective member of UNSCOP independently of both personal bias and the
foreign policy of his country of origin. He approached his
responsibilities with optimism and a conviction that the ultimate
recommendation would be based on the highest morality.19 This was not
true of the other representatives with the exception possibly of Judge
Sandstrom from Sweden. The other members were either biased in advance
or a vehicle for implementing the foreign policy of the country they
represented. The role of the Canadian representative will be examined
by comparing his conduct and views to those of the other members of the
committee. 
c) Bias Among the Representatives
Sir Abdul Rahman, a judge, was of Muslim background with a history
11
of political opposition to partition in India and the forces of
Mahammed Ali Jinnah, the leader of the partition forces and the founder
of Pakistan. He came with an inherent bias against partition, not
because he was a religious nationalist but because he was opposed to
religious nationalism. In the Israeli-Arab conflict, to him it appeared
as if the Jews combined religion and nationalism.
Nasrollah Entezam was an anti-colonialist rather than opposed to
religious nationalism fostering separation. Though sympathetic to the
Arab position and his fellow religionists, his main motivation was a
lack of sympathy to what he perceived to be European colonial
settlements in the Middle East. As an Iranian, he also feared divisions
based on ethnic or religious grounds, even in the form of a federal
solution.
Valado Simic of Yugoslavia, a former Minister of Education and
President of the Yugoslav Senate as well as head of the Yugoslav Bar
Association, was an unanticipated opponent of the Zionist position
supporting partition. Not because he was dictated in his convictions by
ideological instructions from Yugoslavia. That might have dictated that
he take an opposite stand than the one he did adopt. He was not a
member of the Communist Party; he was an independent. He was sensitive
to the sympathies of the Muslims in Bosnia. More importantly, as a
Yugoslav, he had an inherent revulsion against partition in ethnically
and religiously mixed regions.  
Although three of the members of UNSCOP began with strong biases
against the Zionist position, this did not make them supporters of the
Arab claim for a unitary state in Palestine dominated by its majority.
Only Nasrollah Entezam took that position, but this perhaps was as much
a reflection of his conviction about the merits of a unitary state not
based on ethnicity or religion as it was a reflection of pro-Arabism.
In fact, all three would end up supporting the minority report and a
recommendation for a federal state. In a world of either/or, the fact
that they came from Muslim countries or countries where the Muslim fact
was an important ingredient in the political life of their countries,
meant that they were identified as pro-Muslim in their votes. In fact,
their biases may not have been dictated primarily by pro-Muslim or pro-
Arab stances per se, but by varying and overlapping fears of sectarian
and ethnic political divisions.
In that role, Sir Abdul Rahman was the most vociferous and fierce
opponent of partition and, thus, appeared as the most anti-Zionist.
Two members revealed themselves to be strong supporters of the
Zionist position. Their bias arose because they were Latin American
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liberals. The Jews had already established many of the institutional
characteristics favouring democracy and a liberal and pluralistic mode
of conflict. The Arabs were decidedly feudal in their political
organization and intolerant of liberal secular pluralistic cultures.
These two Latin Americans could not envision a solution which placed
fellow liberals under the authority or domination of a top-down
political regime which was unsympathetic to pluralism. Dr. Jorge Garcia
Granados of Guatemala would become an early and most vociferous
spokesperson for the Zionist position on UNSCOP, though Professor
Enrique Fabregat of Uruguay might have been much more effective because
he was not such an ardent advocate of the Zionist cause.20
The Zionists picked up a third supporter. Czechoslovakia was a
federal state with two nationalities and so the representative from
Czechoslovakia might have been expected to take the same position as
the representative from Yugoslavia. But Dr. Karel Lisicky of
Czechoslovakia was a close friend of Ian Masaryk. Ian Masaryk was an
open and strong supporter of Zionism. And Masaryk provided direct
advice to Lisicky during the conduct of the hearings.
Before the committee assembled, an analysis of the convictions of
its members would indicate that three of the members were strongly
opposed to the position of the Jewish Agency and three were in favour
before any evidence had been heard for any of the three alternatives in
front of the committee. There were five members left who seemed subject
to influence by what they observed and studied. But such an image was
belied by reality.
The representative from Peru was Dr. Antonio Garcia-Salazar. He
was a devout Catholic. He had been his country's former Ambassador to
the Vatican and, in the committee he acted as the Vatican ambassador in
its deliberations. It is quite clear that what concerned him was
neither the Zionist position nor the Arab position but the role of the
Catholic Church with respect to Jerusalem and the holy places in that
city. He was persuaded to support partition when there was agreement
that Jerusalem would remain under international auspices with a
prominent role to be given to religious input in the future of the
city.21
This left four members who were conceivably unbiased in their
deliberations. Emil Sandstrom, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Sweden, who became chair of the committee, was perhaps the most
difficult to read. In fact it is only in reading the minutes of the
final days of deliberation that one senses that the experience of the
peaceful partition of Norway from Sweden in 1905 might have profoundly
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influenced his concluding support for partition. Up until that time,
the chair of the committee tended to perform as the cool, detached and
objective judge. Research suggests that, in fact, the Swedes supported
partition all along.22 The swing votes on the participants clearly
belonged to Holland, Australia and Canada.
The representatives from both Australia and the Netherlands were
both senior civil servants from the foreign offices of their repective
country. As civil servants they might have been expected to be the
epitome of those trained to subordinate particular interests to
universal concerns. However, in the modern theory of the state,
universal concerns were not really universal; they were interests of
state. And both Dr. Nicolaas Blom of the Netherlands and John D.L. Hood
of Australia were gentlemen well imbued with the ideology that their
responsibilities were to subordinate their intellects and wills to the
higher interests of state, in this case, the interests of the
Netherlands and Australia respectively.
Of course, this was totally against the terms of reference for
their involvement on UNSCOP. The terms of reference sent by the UN to
the Australian and Netherlands delegation on May 16, 1947 stated that,
"States Members of the Special Committee should appoint persons of high
moral character and of recognized competence in International Affairs,
and that those appointed would act impartially and conscientiously (my
italics) in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations."23 Hood was not there to be a delegate
representing the Department of External Affairs of Australia. Blom was
not there to represent the interests of the Netherlands.
 
Initially, the Netherlands wanted to gain Arab support for their
position in Indonesia. This made the Dutch reluctant to become involved
in a committee where they might be required to take a stand in an area
of direct Arab interest. Holland finally acceeded to becoming a member
of the committee. Dr. Nicolaas Blom, who had served as part of the
Dutch colonial office in the Dutch East Indies - Indonesia - since 1923
when he was 24 years of age (he rose to become acting lieutenant-
governor general) was named the head delegate.24 When named, he received
direct and explicit instructions not to act in any way that might bias
the position and interests of the Netherlands vis a vis Dutch interests
in Indonesia, and specifically not to alienate the Arabs.25 However, he
did not receive clear instructions on how to vote.26 
Dr. Blom was more biased against the Zionists than simply
representing the Dutch foreign policy interests. This was indicated by
the delegations he supported and opposed addressing UNSCOP. The Dutch
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opposed hearing from any Jewish organizations "whose sole purpose is to
support the terrorists in Palestine;"27 they did argue for hearing from
the Arab High Committee. Blom was opposed to hearing a delegation from
the Yishuv concerned with the immanent hanging by the British of
alleged Jewish terrorists28. He also took the initiative in hiring an
Arabist adviser to the committee without even authorization from the
Foreign Office; this action entailed that he ignore a telegram that
informed him that Holland was broke and lacked the money to support an
Arabist expert.29  Finally, Blom and Spits opposed visiting the D.P.
camps in Europe.30 
However, in the last month of the final deliberations of the
committee, the Dutch learned that the Arab League had made a deal to
support Sukarno and oppose the continuation of Dutch colonial rule in
Indonesia.31 Dr. Blom was then free to vote as the information and
deliberations of the committee dictated. In his vote, he was influenced
primarily by the need to resettle the Jewish refugees in Europe; the
proposal of the Freeland League to settle the Jewish refugees in
Surinam had collapsed. The Arab boycott of the Commission, the Arab
unwillingness to compromise whatsoever and, ultimately, the threat of
violence against any solution other than their own extreme one, and,
ultimately, the Arab support for the rebels in Indonesia lost the Arabs
the chance of getting the Dutch to oppose partition.32 The orientation
of the original Dutch delegation to be pro-Arab and anti-Zionist had
been totally reversed, not by the behaviour and arguments of the
Zionists, but by the behaviour of the Arabs and the need to resettle
the Jewish refugees in Europe.
John Hood of Australia also served the interests of his state as
well, but his final position was a result of very different factors.
The Australian delegation's guiding policies are stated clearly in the
records of the department of External Affairs. The Aussies were
committed to, "support the UK in general provided no fundamental
conflict with Australian views."33 Further, even if the UK should decide
to agree to complete withdrawal from Palestine, "any plan for immediate
transfer of power should be opposed on the ground that no solution is
likely to please both Arabs and Jews and the risk of a violent reaction
to an unpopular solution would be considerable."34 Thus, even though the
Australians envisioned the possibility of Britain surrendering the
Mandate, and even though they envisioned partition as the likely
outcome, they did not favour the creation of two independent states,
but the creation of two trusteeships, the " US over Jewish state and an
Arab country over Arab Palestine."35
The interests of state in Australia were also identified with the
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interests of the Rt. Honourable Dr. H. V. Evatt, then the Deputy Prime
Minister of Australia, Attorney General and Minister for External
Affairs as well as Chairman of the Australian Delegation to the UN.
Evatt had lobbied for a seat on UNSCOP and had ensured that Hood was
appointed to that seat. On April 18, 1947, the Australian UN delegation
registered their conviction that an Arab state should have been a
member of UNSCOP. "There should be representation of members acceptable
to the Palestinian Arabs and Jews, e.g., an Arab League Member (Egypt
or Syria was suggested) and the United States."36 As they themselves
said, "We are one of the few Delegations to retain the confidence and
goodwill of Arab States which will be useful in September."37 The
reference was to the election of the President of the General Assembly
which Evatt was seeking. Evatt, one of the architects of the United
Nations, wanted to become the President of the UN General Assembly. He
wanted the Arab votes. In their report for the Fall Session, the
Aistralian delegation stated that, "Justice and Australia's interests
are most clearly allied to the Arab cause which demands a unitary
state."38
Australian support of the UK was understandable. Currying favour
with the Arabs to obtain their vote for Evatt's candidacy for President
of the General Assembly fitted in with old-fashioned politics. But
support for the Arab position was also motivated by the White Australia
policy (the policy of restricting immigrants to Australians to those of
European descent) of which both Evatt and Hood were strong defenders.
In a report Hood wrote in preparation for the Fall Session of 1947, he
explained the stand of the Australian delegation. Respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples was
provided in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter where, "peoples
have not yet attained a full measure of self-government, recognize the
principle that the interests of the inhabitants of those territories
are paramount."39 Evatt was the constitutional expert. He was directly
responsible at San Francisco for the amendments to Article 73 making
precisely this provision. The wording was Evatt's. How did the
Australian delegation interpret the provision? The UN would have to
consult the population. "It also means that a solution which would
force the inhabitants, against the will of the majority to accept any
alteration in the constitution of its population should be opposed. In
fact, from Australia's point of view there would be a narrow line
between the United Nations attempting to impose upon the Palestinian
Arabs an obligation to admit further Jewish immigrants and the United
Nations attempting to open the doors of Australia to Asiatic
immigration on the pretext that the failure to do so might endanger the
peace and that the Australian immigration policy was contrary to the
principle of the Charter in so far as it involved racial
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discrimination."40 It was the White Australia policy which dictated
majoritarian control on racial grounds against newcomers. The principle
of racial discrimination dictated non-interference in the domestic
jurisdiction of a majority population. Hood himself strongly opposed
the Zionist cause because he believed that the creation of the State of
Israel for a minority of Jews in Palestine, who were encouraged to
immigrate to a majority Arab area, would create a precedent for an
international challenge to the restrictive White Australia policy.41 
Loyalty to the UK, personal ambition, and support for the
principles behind the White Australia policy were not the reasons the
Australians proffered for their stand. This is not how Evatt explained
Australia's abstention within UNSCOP on the pro-partition resolution.
"Accordingly when Australia was elected to UNSCOP our delegates, John
Hood and S.L. Atyeo, joined in the full report of the facts without
committing Australia at the time to any firm decision in relation to
the majority and minority recommendation of UNSCOP."42  They abstained
because they claimed UNSCOP was not the place to make a normative
recommendation. 
The explanation was totally implausible. It ran contrary to the
terms of reference of UNSCOP.43 Hood understood that Evatt's insistance
that the Committee's mandate was to serve only as a fact finding body
was just so much rubbish. "We fully understand the view of the
Committee as primarily a fact-finding body, but having regard to the
way in which Committee's work has developed, and also to the terms of
reference from the special assembly it is not a practical question to
exclude recommendations from the report."44
The lack of sympathy to the Jews, the pro-UK outlook, the pro-Arab
attitude and the self interest of Australia and its policy of
preserving White Australia and getting Evatt elected as President of
the General Assembly were all of a piece. They dictated an anti-Zionist
vote, a vote against partition. What needs explanation is why Australia
abstained and did not vote against partition. The Australian delegation
was pro-Arab and not pro-Zionist. 
The reason Australia abstained and did not vote against partition
was that Evatt had read the votes and did not want Hood to alienate
other delegations unnecessarily. Evatt became afraid that Hood would
take a stand against partition.45 The Minister on August 10, 1947 cabled
the Ambassador in Geneva where the committee had retreated to write
their report to, "Tell Hood at once that he should not at this stage
take any line against partition of Palestine. He has never been
authorised to do so and is there solely to report on events and not to
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(illegible) without prior official consultation with us."46 
 On August 23, 1947, Hood received definite instructions from the
Department of External Affairs. "Most important we should not be
committed to any recommendation." "Fact and alternative solutions and
not recommendations should be included."47 Hood cabled back the next day
indicating a majority support for partition, his preference for the
minority report for a federation, the impending pressure on Australia
to make up its mind and his preference to do so, and then the important
note that Hood and Atyeo had not yet committed themselves.
Nevertheless, Hood, ever the loyal civil servant abstained in the final
vote.
Unlike Blom and Hood, Rand had a mandate to act as an independent
participant in UNSCOP according to the terms of reference of that
committee. "The Canadian representative has not been instructed by the
Canadian government concerning the policy he is to advocate or
support,"48  St. Laurent announced to the House of Commons on May 22,
1947. Canada's appointee was specifically instructed by External
Affairs Minister St. Laurent (soon to become Prime Minister) "to act in
an independent capacity"49 as much to preserve Canada's flexibility as
to ensure that the 'best possible person' would serve with distinction.
Rand as a liberal might be inclined to follow Granados and
Fabregat, but, as a federalist in a binational state with strong ties
to Britain, he might be inclined against partition. As David Bercuson
summed up Rand's position, "There is no evidence whatever that Rand
went to Palestine with any preconceived notions about specific
solutions to the Palestine question, but there is no doubt that, while
there, he decided the mandate must be ended and a partition made. The
kind of partition which he favoured, however, was quite close to
federation."50 Rand wanted partition with economic association, a
position now labelled in Canada as sovereignty association. 
By studying the minutes of UNSCOP and the archival materials of
delegations, one has the distinct impression that, of the eleven
delegations, five changed their minds as a result of the committees
deliberations and external events that altered the policies of their
countries on the Middle East. Two of these, India and Iran, changed
from support for a unitary state to support for a federal one. Austalia
and the Netherlands also shifted from supporting the Arab position, but
because of international events and their effects on the policies of
their respective countries. Australia abstained even though the
delegate wanted to vote for federation and even though the delegation
was initially adamantly opposed to partition. The Netherlands voted for
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partition even though they initially were opposed to partition because
they wanted to curry favour with the the Arabs. Interests of state
caused the shift, not what the delegates saw and heard. Only Ivan Rand
changed his position because of what he heard. He shifted from
supporting a federalist solution to support for partition with as much
icing of federlism as could have been placed on the partition cake.
d) Talk to Hide the Walk
Why then was Ralph Bunche so contemptuous of Rand whom he found
to be "the greatest disappointment," an individual who "talked
incessantly (my emphasis) without contributing anything"?51 After all,
Rand was the only individual who truly approached the issue from a
relatively unbiased standpoint. The contempt stands out because Bunche
had no similar attitude to any of the other delegates. 
To understand Bunche's attitude and to throw more light on Rand,
something more must be added about Bunche himself. Ralph Bunche was not
neutral even though as a thorough professional he wrote both the
majority and minority reports. He was an American and the Director of
the Trusteeship Division of the U.N. He was opposed to all three
solutions on the table and wanted a trusteeship so that there would be
continuity in the legal authority over Palestine once the Mandate was
ended. Since Rand was an eminent jurist, Bunche must have been taken
aback that Rand did not recognize the need for legal continuity in
Palestine, Bunche's main preoccupation. This, however, is insufficient
to explain his strong contempt for Rand. 
Rand was a Canadian who believed that the investigations of the
committee and the discussions among the members would determine the
result. What is clear is that virtually all the other participants were
realists or romantics. Bunche could handle and deal with both; he knew
that the basis of their positions were to be found in self interest or
ideology. 
 Rand, however, approached his work like a moralist, but one
without any fundamental moral principles. Bunche, on the other hand,
approached international affairs from the perspective of rights. He was
a true Kantian. The eulogy given at his funeral sums up Bunche's
approach to the problems of the world. 
Bunche stood for peace, whereas his country stood for war;
he stood for honesty, whereas his country stands for
duplicity; he stood for justice, whereas his country stood
for power; and he stood for mankind, while his country
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stands for race master...Bunche was a moral stranger in
this immoral land, a prophet without honour, a man whose
principles were rejected as a way of life by the land he so
diligently tried to serve.52
Rand, by contrast, resided in a moral land. He was a jurist with
honour, but one where it was difficult to know what he stood for.
Bunche could deal with realists; they surrounded him when he was at the
State Department and they were preeminent on the international stage.
Bunche also understood romantics since he was somewhat of a romantic
himself even though he tried to subordinate that romanticism to his
combination of rights morality and pragmatism which recognized that
much of human behaviour was governed by prejudice and virulent
nationalism, by racial and religious bigotry. But how do you deal with
rationalists who purportedly also tried to occupy the high ground?
The good ship "Humanity" often lists badly from an over
ballast of cold intellectuality. Mere intellectuality, per
se, is barren, without feeling or conscience. Rabelais has
said that science without conscience--conscience--is the
deprivation of the soul.53
For Bunche, Rand was the cold, barren intellectual without a moral
compass whose "moral values assume(d) an increasing vagueness," a man
without "soulfulness, spirituality, imagination, altruism, vision."54
Ironically, in Bunche's hierarchy of enemies, the cold rationalist
without either conviction or a recognition that others were governed by
self-interest or prejudice was the most contemptible.
What role, however, did the believer in rational discourse, the
incessant talker play in the discussion? I have tried to indicate that
he had no influence on the decisions of others. If anything, it was
Bunche who tried to join economic federalism to political partition in
a hybrid which at that time was like putting a two-headed lion on a
lamb's body. In a context in which three clear alternatives were before
the committee and a fourth - trusteeship - lurked in the background,
Rand only added complications to a problem that was already very
confused. Where clear cut decisions and choices were needed backed by
whatever legal and formal authority and the threat of international
coercion as could be mustered was what was needed, the worst of all
possible alternatives was a naive belief that some rational compromise
could be forged through discussion when one of the parties adamantly
refused even to be part of the discussion. Rand only added
complications to the partition proposal put forth by Entezam.
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Inspite of this, the Canadian vote for partition itself was
clearly crucial. The internal make-up of the committee, facilitated by
historical contingencies, not the external pressures from either the
Arab boycott or the very effective lobbying efforts of Abba Eban and
David Horowitz, were the main determinants of the outcome. And in that
determination, although the final vote for partition was 7 to 3 for
partition with one abstention, the Netherlands could easily have voted
against partition which might have influenced the final vote of the
Peruvian delegate. Australia then might have also cast its vote for a
federal solution, which would have reinforced Rand's inclination to do
the same. In other words, with an alteration in some contingent
circumstances, the vote of UNSCOP could have easily been 7 to 4 against
partition and for a federal state. 
My point, here, however, is to indicate that Canada was unique in
being the most neutral about its decision and most influenced by what
its delegates saw and heard rather than any prior convictions. As it
turned out, by accident of circumstances, this posture was critically
important to the final outcome, but not to the process of influencing
the decisions of others.
This, however, is only half the story. Observing that half alone,
one is tempted to share Bunche's view that Rand merely added unnecessay
complications and added to the fears that the committee would never
arrive at a recommendation. Look, however, at those who shifted
positions. Rahman and Entezam deserted their unequivocal support for a
unitary state to support federalism. One can speculate that Rahman was
either persuaded by his fellow commonwealth jurist to support a federal
solution which allowed for ethnic based units as Canada had, and/or
that he did not want to take an extreme position given what he had
heard and seen. Without accessing the Indian archives, any conclusion
is still speculative. But whatever the explanation for Rahman's and
Entezam's shifts in position, Rand's incessant talk gave their shifts
a rational cover.
In the case of Australia and Holland, the surface icing of
rational discourse provided an even greater camouflage to the reality
underneath. Hood and Blom deserted their support for the Arabs to
abstain and support partition respectively. Through the discussion and
reading only the minutes of the UNSCOP proceedings, and the fact that
both Hood and Blom were very circumspect and said little to betray
their positions, a careless reader who did not access either the
Australian or Dutch archives could easily read into either Hood's or
Blom's statements support for partition. After all, Hood participated
in the working group on partition even though he opposed partition as
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1. There have been many studies of the peace process from the angle
of the immediate players in the region (too many in fact to select
any) as well as on the role of the superpowers. On the latter, see,
for example, Michael J. Cohen's focus on the early years in Palestine
and the Great Powers: 1945-1948, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1982, and Paul Marantz and Blema Steinberg, eds. Superpower
Involvement in the Middle East, Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, Stven
Spiegel, ed. Conflict Management in the Middle East, Boulder:
Westview Press, 1992, or William B. Quandt's more focused study on
the American involvement - Peace Process: Arab Diplomacy and the
Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, Berkely: University of California
Press, 1993. Other studies have covered the role of international
brokers and mediators - Saadia Touval's The Peace Brokers: Mediators
in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982, and Thomas Princen's more general analysis,
Intermediaries in International Conflict, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1992. There have even been some studies which have
tried to encompass the role of the immediate players, the superpowers
and international intervenors such Babriel Ben-Dor and David Dewitt,
eds., Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East, Boulder:
Westview Press, 1994. There have even been studies of the foreign
policy of minor players focused on the Middle East such as David
Bercuson's Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian
Foreign Policy, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985. This
study differs from all of these in its micro-analysis of a very minor
player and its concern more with discerning how the involvement was a
reflection of the national character of the player rather than on the
effectiveness of the performance in the process itself.
2. Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: The Vaklues and
Institutions of the United States and Canada, New York: Routledge,
1990, p. 42.
3. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1971.
we now know. Blom changed positions because the foreign policy of the
Netherlands had altered while the committee was deliberating. The
incessant talk and their relative silence gave the impression of people
listening and being influenced when, in fact, the factors dictating
their stances originated elsewhere. Talk is the perfect camouflage for
devious behaviour and motives. Neither Blom not Hood changed positions
because of what they saw and heard and less because of what was
discussed. But they allowed others to believe that their positions were
a result of those factors. Rand's incessant talk served to cover the
real positions that lay behind their silences.
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4. Cf. for example, Geoffrey Aronson, Creating facts: Israel,
Palestinians & the West Bank, Washington: Institute for palestine
Studies, 1987.
5. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice and the Liberal State, New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.
6. Cf. Lori Fisler, Damrosch & David J. Scheffer, eds., Law and Force
in the New International Order, Boulder: Westview, 1991, or the more
focused study by Nathan Pelcovits, The Long Armistice: UN
Peacekeeping and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1960, Boulder:
Westview Press, 1993.
7. Cf. Thomas Donaldson, "Kant's Global Rationalism," in Terry Nardin
and David Mapel, Traditions of International Ethics, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 136-157.
8. For a theoretical analysis of the role of camouflage in
international mediation and peace making, see Howard Adelman,
"Towards a Confidence Transformational Dialectic," in Gabriel Ben Dor
and David Dewitt (1994) pp. 311-332.
9. The plan was first put forth by Sir Douglas Harris, treasurer of
the Palestine administration, and put before the Labour Cabinet in
Britain in September of 1945. Henry F. Grady was a lawyer who had
served as a special envoy for President Roosevelt. Herbert Morrison
was Chairman of the British Cabinet.  
10. When Bevin asked the AAC to make a recommendation, he had
envisioned that they would push an interim solution "until such time
as a permanent solution can be submitted to the appropriate        of
the United Nations". (Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol.
415, col. 1930)  A Trusteeship was then envisioned as succeeding the
existing Mandate. (op. cit., col. 1931-2) Reference to the U.N. was
to be delayed as long as possible; it was the least desired option
because it would seriously impair Britain's strategic position and
political standing in the Middle East.
11. Cf. Council on Foreign Relations, 1947-48, p. 1.
12. A/287-291, cf. Zasloff (1952), p. 50.
13. Whether the motive for this was legal or, as Zasloff contends,
political (given the desire of Britain to avoid further offending the
Arabs --p. 93), is a separate issue.  (cf. Zasloff, op. cit., p. 90.)
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14. Cf. Pearson (1985), p. 60                  April 24, 1947, Canada
DEA, B-3, Vol. 2152.
15. Cf. 9-B-2.
16. Bercuson (1985), p. 61. from Canada, DEA files, file 47B (s),
SSEA to Canadian Ambassador in Washington, April 18, 1947.
17. Canada DEA, B-3, Vol. 2152, April 2, 1947 "Palestine and the
Special Assembly of the United Nations". cf. Bercuson (1984) p. 63.
18. The Arabs made a claim for at least one member on the committee
after their opposition to it being set up was defeated. Bill Epstein,
a U.N. civil servant, was excluded from the secretariat of the
committee because he was Jewish. S. Mahamoud of Egypt was also left
off the secretariat.
19. King Papers, vol. 428, Rand to King, June 8, 1947 and quoted in
Bercuson (1985) p. 82.
20. However, contrary to British intelligence on the Latin American
bias, it was not dictated by Latin American government orders. In a
footnote in a Report on the United Nations Special Assembly on
Palestine, written by R.H. Hadow, he refers to his belief that the
"Latin American bias in favour of any resolution or policy advocating
'independence' was clearly shown and needs to be borne constantly in
mind." On page 2 of the Report, in his reference to Uruguay in
paragraph 5, Hadow claimed that,
"Zionist pressure - which was commonly believed to accord with secret
United States policy - was particularly noticeable in the case of
URUGUAY; whose representative, Sr. Fabregat, honestly admitted that
his personal predilections, as well as his government's orders (which
I saw) gave him no choice in the matter of giving all possible
assistance to Zionist aspirations"..."as thesole cure for the
D.P. problem...Whether these orders reflected a somewhat Utopian one-
sidedness to which Uruguay is given, or showed a more worldly desire
to fend off requests that Displaced Persons be admitted to Uruguay is
difficult to say. But Sr. Fabregat was notably on the Zionist side
throughout the Assembly; and he also gave a degree of help and
comfort to Mr. Gromyko which Dr. Aranha (who had once befriended him
in exile) attributed to his 'red' tendencies." (R.H. Hadow,
Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, Washington, Report to P. Gore-
Booth, United Nations Palestine Assembly: Latin America, May 17,
1947, 
London: Kew Gardens, FO 371 Ref, 67587A File 2593.) In the same
report, Hadow also claimed bias on the part of the Guatemalan
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delegate. "We might run into difficulties if Guatemala were elected -
because of Sr. Garcia Granados' personal and governmental views with
regard to British Honduras."
21. "His religious views coloured his approach to the Palestine
question and inclined him to concentrate on the issue of Jerusalem
and the holy places more than any other aspect of the problem." 
Bercuson (1985), p. 78.
22. In fact, Paul Mohn, the Swedish alternate, was explicit that he
actually preferred partition even before the committee began its
hearings. Blom, in a June 9, 1947 report to the Department of Foreign
Affairs of Holland, noted following a conversation with the Dutch
speaking Dr. Paul Mohn, "Hij neemt aan, dat er in Palestina niet
voldoende plaats is voor de Joden, die Europa willen verlaten en dat
in dat gebied dus nimmer een algehele oplossing van het Joodse
probleem zal kunnen worden gevonden. Hij stelt voorop, dat de
bestuursvorm van Palestina het voornaamste vraagpunt voor die
Commissie is, staat daarbij persoonlijk een splitsing voor." Mohn was
concerned that there would not be enough room in Palestine for the
Jews who wanted to leave Europe.
23. ANA, 852/20/2 Pt. 1.
24. Blom was not the obvious appointee. Initially, Dr. van Roijen,
the Ambassador to Canada and the head of the Dutch UN delegation, had
been favoured to be the representative on UNSCOP. Roijen was not
available. Professor van Asbeck seemed to be next in line. He, in
fact, might have been elected as Chairman since he was far better
known than Sandstrom. But he also might have been expected to be
biased towards the Zionist position given his unqualified legal
advice to Blom that the Mandate clearly and without qualification
indicated that the terms of the Mandate favoured unlimited
immigration for the Jews. "Hij (Blom) had tevoren een onderhoud gehad
met Prof. van Asbeck, die gelijk reeds eerder gebleken is uit een
onderhoud, dat Prof. Francois en ik met Prof. van Asbeck hadden, zich
op het standpunt stelt, dat krachtens de Balfour-Verklaring de Joodse
zaak, wat Palestina betreft, sterker staat dan die der Arabieren en
die, wanneer hij het voor'tzeggen zou hebben, zou gaan in de richting
van onbeperkte immigratie en een algemene beslissing ter gunste van
de Joden." (Cf. MVBZ, the telex dated May 17, 1947 (File 122) #465646
from the Dutch Delegation in New York to the Hague) The evidence
suggests Blom was appointed rather than van Asbeck precisely because
he was not in favour of the Zionist position.
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25. The clearest statement of the Dutch delegation concern not to
alienate the Arabs by taking any stand directly and clearly opposed
to them lest the Arabs oppose the Dutch position in Indonesia came
from Blom and Spits themselves in their May 28, 1947 memo to the
Foreign Office."In het gesprek heb ik ten allen overvloede nog eens
doen uitkomen, dat het met het oog op Nederlandsch-Indie in het
algemeen gewenst zal zijn te vermijden, dat van Nederlandse zijde te
sterk tegenover de Arabieren stelling wordt genomen".
26. In my article submitted for publication to a Dutch journal, I
document in detail the bias of Blom on the committee, not simply
towards Britain as Bercuson (1985) contended (p. 79). Blom was simply
the conduit for Dutch foreign policy. The Dutch delegation had not
received instructions simply because the Foreign Office had not yet
decided on what instructions to give. Blom, and Spits, his alternate,
like good senior civil servants of a department, had asked for those
instructions."Mr. Blom, die op 28 Mei a.s. met Mr. Spits naar New-
York vertrekt voor de Commissie van Onderzoek inzake Palestina, vroeg
mij, of de Minister hem voor deze taak bepaalde instructies zou
willen geven". "Mr. Blom verklaarde de zaak nog niet voldoende te
kunnen beoordelen om zich reeds in de een of andere richting te
kunnen vitspreken en ik heb hem gezegd, dat ook de Minister niet een
bepaald standpunt heeft ingenomen". Though Mr. Blom left for New York
without any advice, when the deliberations of the Commission entered
a stage at which a position had to be taken, Blom was told to report
to the Minister, advise on the position he was inclined to take and
then ask how he should vote. "Ik heb nu met Mr. Blom afgesproken, dat
hij zonder instructies naar New York vertrekt en dat hij, wanneer de
beraadslagingen in de Commissie in een stadium komen, dat hij zich
moet uitspreken, hij de Minister zal mededelen welk standpunt hij zou
willen innemen en dan dienaangaande instructies zal vragen."(MVBZ,
UNSCOP Delegation, May 28, 1947.)
27. Cf. MVBZ, Minutes of the Dutch Delegation, May 6, 1947.
28. Blom and Spits were opposed to taking up the issue of the three
Zionists that the UK had condemned to hang. In their July 30th
Report, they noted that the real problem was Jewish terrorism and
echoed with sympathy the complaints of the English High Commissioner
that the Jewish Agency may condemn acts of terrorism in public, but
they provide no help in finding the culprits. "(B)eklaagde zich er
echter over, dat van Joodse zijde onvoldoende medewerking wordt
verkregen in het bestrijden van terroristische activiteit. Wel
verklaarden de leiders van het Joodse Agentschap zich openlijk tegen
de regelmatig bedreven daden van geweldpleging. Doch wanneer het er
op aankwam, hun actieve medewerking te verkrijgen in het opsporen of
26
berechten van daders, bleek deze steeds onverkrijgbaar. Geen enkele
Jood is bereid als getuige op te treden tegen een gearresteerde
Joodse terrorist." MVBZ, Blom Report to the Foreign Ministry, July
30, 1947, p. 6, para. 19.
29. The Dutch tried to get a Dutch Arabist appointed as an advisor to
UNSCOP because they wanted the Arabs to identify with the Dutch
position in Indonesia and the Indonesians to learn from the Arabs
about the dangers of communist infiltration. The effort was
eventually frustrated by the shortage of funds in the Netherlands
since, as in the UK, the economy had collapsed and Holland was
completely dependent on the U.S.A. for hard currency. "De Heer Oetoyo
bevestigt dit gerucht. Hij heeft nl. van de Saoedi-Arabische
Delegatie vernomen, dat de leden van den Arabischen Bond bang zijn
geworden voor communistische penetratie. Naar aanleiding hiervan
merkt de Heer Oetoyo op, dat het wellicht wenschelijk is om indien
Nederland in de Commissie van Onderzoek wordt gekozen aan de
Nederlandschen vertegenwoordiger een Indonesischen adviseur toe te
voegen, hetgeen t.z.t. het tegengaan van communistische infiltratie
in Indonesie gunstig zou beinvloeden. Deze Indonesische adviseur
immers zou in voorkomende gevallen nauw contact hebben en houden met
de verschillende Arabische instanties en daardoor de gevaren van
communistiche invloed duidelijker gaan inzien en kunnen rapporteeren
in Indonesie". MVBZ, Minutes, Dutch U.N. delegation meeting in New
York, May 6, 1947. 
30. They argued that such visits were entirely unnecessary to fulfil
the functions of UNSCOP. "Omtrent de vraag, of de kampen van
displaced persons in Europe zullen worden bezocht, nog geen besluit
genomen. De beslissing daaromtrent is na bespreking uitgesteld tot na
het bezoek aan Palestina. Hoe de beslissing terzake zal uitvallen, is
nog niet te voorspellen. Voorshands wil het mij persoonlijk
voorkomen, dat zodanig bezoek niet nodig is." 
31. In Beirut, the Lebanese representative showed Blom and Spits a
cabled message addressed to Azzam Pasha (the Secretary General of the
Arab League), signed by Sukarno (Soekarno in Dutch), stating,
"Indonesian Muslims fully sympathetic with Arab demands in Palestine
problem STOP Wishing you every success." A/AC. 13 Final Report of
Blom to FO, p. 25. 
32. With the exception of Transjordan, the Arab position was
generally uncompromising. They wanted Palestine as an independent
Arab state, the discontinuation of all immigration and were only
willing to allow the Jews that lived in Palestine at the time of the
Balfour Declaration, and their progeny, to remain. All others would
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be considered foreigners. They were adamant about opposing any other
solution with violence. "De Arabische vertegenwoordigers namen èn
in de gezamenlijke beant woording èn bij de gelegenheden, waarin
zij individueel iets aan de beantwoording toevoegden, een volkomen
onverzoenlijk standpunt in. Zij eischen, dat Palestina terstond een
onafhankelijke Arabische staat zal worden met volledige stopzetting
van de immigratie. Zij zijn bereid de Joden, die ten tijde van de
Balfour-declaratie in Palestina woonden en hun nakomelingen als
volledige burgers van het land te erkennen, doch alle andere Joden
zullen de status van vreemdeling krijgen of behouden...Toen een lid
van de Commissie opmerkte, dat de vroegere tegenstrijdige beloften
een typisch voorbeeld waren van een situatie, waarin een compromis
dient te worden gezocht, was het antwoord, dat de Arabische Staten
hun recht niet deden steunen op enige belofte, maar op het
feit, dat zij op hun eigen grondgebied hun eigen regeringsvorm wensen
te bepalen. Een belofte van geallieerde zijde gedurende de Ferste
Wereldoorlog was daartoe niet nodig en irrelevant. Zij erkenden
derhalve niet het bestaan van een situatie, welke een compromis ter
oplossing eiste." MVBZ, Blom, July 30, 1947 Report to the FO, pp. 8-
9, para. 28.




37. ANA, April 22/47, 852/19/1.
38. ANA, 852/20/2 Pt.1.
39. ANA, 852/20/2 Pt. 1.
40. ANA, File 852/20/2 Pt. 1., p. 18.
41. Cf. Howard Adelman, "Australia and the Birth of Israel: Midwife
or Abortionist", forthcoming in the Australian Journal of Politics
and History, for a lengthy elaboration of this account. I do not know
where Bercuson (1985 - p. 95) obtained the view that Hood in the
meetings of the committee in Geneva on August 6, 1947 had pronounced
himself in favour of partition. 
42. Herbert V. Evatt, The Task of Nations, New York: Duel, Sloan and
Pearce, 1949, p. 131.
28
43. Clause 2 of the Terms of Reference states that, "The special
committee shall have the widest powers to ascertain and record facts,
and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem
of Palestine." Clause 6 makes it perfectly clear that UNSCOP is not
just a fact-finding mission. "The special committee shall prepare a
report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it
may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of
Palestine." (New York, United Nations Archives, Minutes, United
Nations General Assembly, seventy ninth plenary meeting, May 15,
1947.)
44. Op. cit.
45. This concern that Hood might vote against partition reinforces
the prevailing view that Evatt always supported the Zionist position.
Given Evatt's subsequent devotion and enthusiasm for the Zionist
position, it is hard to believe that Evatt even instructed Hood to
even abstain let alone take an earlier stand directing Hood to vote
against the Zionist position. Look at Evatt's subsequent actions. The
special Ad Hoc Committee chaired by Evatt recommended partition to
the General Assembly. In the alphebetic roll call on the vote in the
Ad Hoc Committee, even though Australia held the Chair, Australia
cast the first yea vote for partition after Afghanistan voted against
and Argentina abstained. Further, Evatt claimed that, when he assumed
the role of Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, "I entered upon the
work of the Committee without prejudices in favour of any particular
solution." (Evatt (1949) p. 133.) Since Evatt in his work as chairman
was castigated as undermining the British efforts and regarded as
recalcitrant by the Americans in his activity to ensure that the
partition resolution was passed, it is quite a shock to think of
Evatt as having supported an anti-Zionist position. The British view
was articulated by the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech-Jones. The
major factor which scuppered the British strategy and led the UN to
endorse partition was Evatt's decision as Chair of the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Palestinian Question in the Fall to work, on the one
hand, in two separate committees, one pro-partition and one anti-,
without any real effort at the same time at conciliation between the
Arabs and the Jews in the third Committee. The charge was that the
very committee structure he set up mitigated against conciliation.
(Creech-Jones gave this explanation to Lester Pearson. Canadian
National Archives, Department of External Affairs Files, File 47B(s),
CanDelUN to SSEA, February 21, 1948, no. 232. Cf. David J. Bercuson,
Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy,
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985, p. 148.) The American
State Department concurred in the British view of Evatt's failure to
work for conciliation. Samuel K.C. Kopper of the Office of Near
29
Eastern and African Affairs noted that, "the abortive and utterly
weak efforts of Dr. Evatt to bring conciliation to bear during the
General Assembly session can hardly be classed as United Nations
conciliation." (Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948,
Vol. 5, Part 2, p. 564.) Michael Comay, who headed the Israeli team
at the UN, believed that Evatt was insecure and had a weak ego and
that his (Comay's) flattery in May of 1947 of Evatt personally and of
his importance in the debate had obtained Australia's commitment to
support partition, even while he carried on a pretense of
impartiality to advance his own career. (Israel State Archives,
90.03/2266/15, letter of Michael Comay to Moshe Shertok, May 2, 1947.
cf. also Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East:
1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, The United States, and Postwar
Imperialism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 490.) When Evatt
subsequently became a staunch champion of Israel, he was thereafter
celebrated as a hero of Australian Zionists. The reality, however, is
that in spite of Evatt's close relations with the Jewish Zionist
community of Australia even before 1947, Evatt, primarily because of
personal ambition and the impact of supporting the Zionist cause on
the White Australia policy, was prepared to oppose partition. It was
only when support for the Arabs would have appeared counter-
productive, that he instructed Hood to abstain. Later, when he saw
that the Arabs would not support his candidacy for President, and, in
any case, he did not have the votes to become President, that Evatt
became the champion of partition.
46. ANA, 852/20/2 Pt.1. 
47. Op. cit.
48. Canada, Hansard, June 2, 1947, 3708 (Bercuson (1985), p.77)
49. Canadian Archives, Ottawa, DEA files, file 5475-CD-40c, SSEA to
Canadian Ambassador, in Washington, May 9, 1947 quoted in Bercuson
(1985), p.70.
50. Bercuson (1985) p. 233.
51. US Mission to the UN, Records, Box 57, File US/A/AC.14/1-75, Memo
of conversation dated September 24, 1947, quoted in Berecuson (1985)
p. 105.
52. Quoted frpm "Ralph Bunche: The Man Without a Country," from
Monthly Report, 1972, p. 2, by Charles Henry, "Civil Rights and
National Security: The Case of Ralph Bunche," in Benjamin Rivlin,
ed., Ralph Bunche: The Man and His Times, New York: Holmes & Meier,
30
1990, p. 63.
53. Ralph Bunche, "The Fourth Dimension of Personality," UCLA
Commencement Address, June 1927, in Rivlin (1990) p. 221.
54. Ibid, p. 222.
